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Abstract: This paper proposes new measures of the liberalization level of free trade agreements 
(FTAs). Our measures take three issues into account. First, in order to identify the differences in 
FTA liberalization level over time, we compute the annual liberalization level rather than the level 
during the whole period. Second, our measure includes information on tariff margins, i.e. the 
difference between FTA rates and most favoured nation rates. Third, the restrictiveness of rules of 
origin (RoOs) is also taken into account in order to penalize the liberalization level of products with 
more restrictive RoOs. In this paper, we compute such measures of FTA liberalization level for three 
FTAs in Thailand. 
Keywords: Free trade agreement, rules of origin, FTA utilization 
JEL Classification: F10; F13; F15 
                                                                        
 
1. Introduction 
     While the number of free trade agreements (FTAs) has experienced an explosive 
increase since the 1990s, it becomes important to achieve a sufficiently high 
liberalization level of FTAs. As of January 2013, notification of around 500 FTAs, 
counting goods and services separately, has been provided to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In the North American FTA (NAFTA), the U.S. and Mexico 
completed the elimination of tariff rates for all products in regard to each other. On the 
                                                   
# Corresponding author: Kazunobu Hayakawa; Address: Bangkok Research Center, Japan External 
Trade Organization, 16th Floor, Nantawan Building, 161 Rajadamri Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok 
10330, Thailand; Tel: 66-2-253-6441; Fax: 66-2-254-1447; E-mail: 
kazunobu_hayakawa@ide-jetro.org. 
§ This research was conducted as part of a project of the Japan External Trade Organization 
“Comprehensive Analysis on Consequence of Trade and Investment Liberalization in East Asia”. We 
are grateful to Fukunari Kimura, Kohei Shiino, and Seiya Sukegawa for their helpful comments. The 
opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent the views of any of the 
institutions with which we are affiliated. 
2 
 
other hand, almost all other existing FTAs allow member countries not to reduce tariff 
rates for a limited number of products. For example, Japan has around 10% of all 
products (tariff line-level) in which tariff rates have never been eliminated in any of its 
FTAs. Also, in the case of the Chile-European Union (EU) FTA, the EU has not 
liberalized almost 10% of all products against Chile. In general, moreover, the 
liberalization level is lower in the case of FTAs based on the Enabling Clause than that 
of FTAs under GATT Article XXIV. 
     Several measures have been used for the evaluation of FTA liberalization levels. 
A typical measure is the share of “liberalized” products within all products. Even in this 
measure, there are some variations. The first is whether to calculate such a share in trade 
value-basis or product number-basis. However, since highly-protected products usually 
have low trade values, a high share of liberalized products may be obtained on a 
value-basis, even if protected products are not liberalized at all. Thus, a number-basis 
measure might be preferable. The second is the calculation level, i.e. harmonized system 
(HS) six-digit level (for which codes are common across countries) or tariff-line level. 
The third is what “liberalized” stands for. In FTAs, the tariff rates for some products are 
reduced, but not necessarily to zero, i.e. incomplete elimination. Obviously, the 
liberalization level when incomplete elimination is included in a definition of 
“liberalized” becomes higher. 
     In addition to these variations, three more issues are potentially important. First, 
FTAs usually reduce tariff rates gradually. This means both that tariff reduction for 
some products starts some years after an agreement comes into force, and that tariff 
rates for some products are not immediately eliminated but are subsequently lowered to 
zero. Thus, the FTA liberalization level becomes different during the years after its entry 
into force. Also, FTAs with relatively long tariff elimination periods (e.g. 15 or 20 
years) in which some products start tariff reduction/elimination from the latter phase of 
said period may not be effective, at least during the early phase. The second issue is 
Most Favoured Nation rates (MFN rates). If liberalized products are significantly biased 
to those already with zero or low MFN rates, liberalization levels might be considered 
insufficient, since such FTAs will not yield much of a trade creation effect. The third is 
the rules of origin (RoOs). RoOs include change-in-tariff classification (CTC) rules, real 
value-added content (RVC) rules, and technical requirement/specific process (TECH) 
rules. It is well known that compliance with both CTC and RVC is rather restrictive, 
particularly compared with co-equal types, i.e. the compliance with either CTC or RVC. 
It is doubtful as to whether “liberalized” products with prohibitively restrictive RoOs 
can be classified as preferential products. 
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     The purpose of this paper is to propose new measures of FTA liberalization level. 
Our measures take the above three issues into account. Specifically, in order to identify 
the differences in FTA liberalization level over time, we compute the annual 
liberalization level rather than the level during the whole period. Also, our measure 
includes information on tariff margins, i.e. the difference between FTA rates and MFN 
rates. The restrictiveness of RoOs is also taken into account in order to penalize the 
liberalization level of products with more restrictive RoOs. In this paper, we compute 
such measures of FTA liberalization level in Thailand for three ASEAN+1 FTAs, i.e. 
ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA), and ASEAN-JAPAN 
FTA (AJCEP). ACFTA, AKFTA, and AJCEP came into force in 2004, 2010, and 2008, 
respectively. Obviously, these measures are useful to judge which FTA truly has the 
higher liberalization level.  
     The crucial difficulty lies in the quantification of each type of RoOs’ 
restrictiveness. Two methods have been proposed. One is the synthetic RoOs restrictive 
index, which was proposed by Estevadeordal (2000). He assigned a score to each type 
of RoOs, ranging from one to seven for NAFTA. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004) 
developed this further. Cadot et al. (2006) regress this index on FTA utilization rates. 
The other method, which we employ in this paper, is to estimate the tariff-equivalent 
compliance costs of each type of RoOs. Carrere and de Melo (2006) is an important 
study in this method. They regress tariff margin and RoOs type dummy variables for 
NAFTA utilization rates and estimate those costs by dividing each of the coefficients for 
the RoOs dummy variables by the coefficient for tariff margin. This paper regresses 
FTA utilization rates in Thai imports, obtains the estimates of tariff-equivalent 
compliance costs of RoOs, and then calculates our measures of FTA liberalization level 
in Thailand for some ASEAN+1 FTAs. 
     This paper is the first to measure such sophisticated liberalization level in goods. 
Some research has evaluated the liberalization level in the whole FTA. For example, 
Feng and Genna (2003) report the average of scores among several categories such as 
“trade in goods and services”, “the degree of capital mobility”, “the degree of labour 
mobility”, and so on. Each category has a score of 0 through 5 with higher scores 
translating to higher liberalization levels in each category. Horn et al. (2010) and the 
World Trade Organization (2011) count the number of provisions that are inside and 
outside the current mandate of the World Trade Organization (WTO). These scores and 
numbers are useful in evaluating the overall liberalization level of FTAs. In contrast, our 
liberalization measure will contribute to uncovering the depth of trade liberalization in 
goods. 
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     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section formalizes our 
measures of FTA liberalization level. Section 3 estimates tariff-equivalent compliance 
costs of RoOs in addition to providing some basic information on ASEAN+1 FTAs. 
Section 4 reports the results of our measures of FTA liberalization level in Thailand for 
some ASEAN+1 FTAs. In Section 5, we conduct some robustness checks. Last, Section 
6 concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. New Measures of FTA Liberalization Level 
     This section formalizes our multiple measures of FTA liberalization level. All 
measures lie in the unit interval [0, 1]. 
First, a well-used measure is the following. LIB1 = ∑ 𝟏�𝑡𝑖MFN > 𝑡𝑖FTA or 𝑡𝑖MFN = 0�𝑖∈Ω ∑ 𝟏(𝑖 ∈ Ω)𝑖∈Ω . 
1(x) is the indicator function, which is 1 if the expression x holds, and is 0 if x is false. 
Subscript i indicates HS code. Ω is a set of all (tariff-line) HS codes. tiMFN and tiFTA are 
MFN and FTA tariff rates, respectively. For products placed in the exclusion list (i.e. 
FTA ineligible products), we set that tiMFN = tiFTA. We omit time script for brevity. This 
measure is a product number-basis share of liberalized products in all products. The 
liberalized products include those in which tariff rates are reduced but not necessarily to 
zero. The products with zero MFN rates are also included in the numerator. This is 
simple and makes it easy to understand the extent of FTA liberalization. 
Second, as mentioned in the introductory section, the above measure does not 
take into account at all how much FTAs contribute to reducing tariff rates. In the second 
measure, we include “tariff reduction rates”, which is defined as (tiFTA − tiMFN)/ tiMFN. 
The liberalization measure is as follows. 
LIB2 = −∑ u𝑖𝑖∈Ω∑ 𝟏(𝑖 ∈ Ω)𝑖∈Ω , where u𝑖 ≡ ��𝑡𝑖FTA − 𝑡𝑖MFN𝑡𝑖MFN � if 𝑡𝑖MFN ≠ 0
−1 if 𝑡𝑖MFN = 0. 
In this measure, ui becomes closer to −1 if the difference between FTA rates and MFN 
rates in product i is larger. It becomes −1 in the case of products with zero MFN rates. 
This measure indicates how much an FTA (and WTO) reduces tariff rates. 
     Third, we furthermore take the restrictiveness of RoOs into account. The measure 
is: 
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LIB3 = −∑ v𝑖𝑖∈Ω∑ 𝟏(𝑖 ∈ Ω)𝑖∈Ω , where v𝑖
≡
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�
𝑡𝑖
FTA − 𝑡𝑖
MFN
𝑡𝑖
MFN � if 𝑡𝑖MFN ≠ 0 and 𝑡𝑖MFN − 𝑡𝑖FTA ≥ ROO𝑖0 if 𝑡𝑖MFN ≠ 0 and 𝑡𝑖MFN − 𝑡𝑖FTA < ROO𝑖
−1 if 𝑡𝑖MFN = 0 , 
where ROO is the RoOs compliance costs, of which details are defined in the next 
section. While in the second measure we sum up tariff reduction rates in all products 
with positive MFN rates, the third measure does not sum up those for products in which 
the tariff margin is smaller than the RoOs compliance costs. This measure indicates how 
much an FTA substantially reduces tariff rates. 
     Fourth, we take smoothly into account tariff margin and RoOs restrictiveness. The 
measure is given by LIB4 = −∑ w𝑖𝑖∈Ω∑ 𝟏(𝑖 ∈ Ω)𝑖∈Ω , where w𝑖
≡ �
�
𝑡𝑖
FTA − 𝑡𝑖
MFN
𝑡𝑖
MFN � × 𝑓�𝑡𝑖MFN − 𝑡𝑖FTA − ROO𝑖� if 𝑡𝑖MFN ≠ 0
−1 if 𝑡𝑖MFN = 0. 
𝑓(∙) is a function such that� lim𝑥→+∞𝑓(𝑥) = 1𝑓 ′(𝑥) > 0lim
𝑥→−∞
𝑓(𝑥) = 0. 
In the third measure, for products with positive MFN rates, we sum up exactly the tariff 
reduction rates if the tariff margin is greater than the RoOs compliance costs, and do not 
include them at all otherwise. The fourth measure modifies this all-or-nothing treatment. 
Specifically, we discount the tariff reduction rates by using a function f. This function 
takes a value closer to zero if the RoOs compliance costs are greater, while it takes a 
value closer to one if the tariff margin is greater. For such a function, we employ the 
logistic function, i.e. f (x) = ex / (1 + ex). 
     The comparability of these measures is as follows. Other things being equal, each 
measure is comparable across years and across exporters. We cannot compare the 
liberalization level across measures. Also, we should be careful in comparing each 
measure across importers due to the following two facts. One is that MFN rates differ 
between importers.1 However, the above measures focus on “tariff reduction rates”, not 
                                                   
1 Thus, as long as focusing on a single importing country, it does not matter qualitatively whether or 
not to include products with zero MFN rates in the computation of FTA liberalization measures. 
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on the tariff margin (i.e. not percent points). Furthermore, we score products with zero 
MFN rates to the (absolutely) highest value, 1. Thus, differences in MFN rates might 
not be a serious issue. The other is that the fineness of tariff-line codes is different 
between importers. This issue is critical because we cannot predict even the direction of 
biases according to the fineness of tariff-line codes. 
 
 
3. Quantification of RoOs’ Restrictiveness 
     This section quantifies the RoOs’ restrictiveness. To do that, we follow the 
method proposed in Carrere and de Melo (2006). Specifically, focusing on one importer, 
we estimate the following simple equation for the determinants of FTA utilization.2 
Utilizationip = α Marginip + Dip β + εip. 
Utilizationip is the FTA utilization rates in importing product p from country i and is 
defined as the share of preferential imports of product p from country i in total imports 
of product p from country i. Marginic is the preference tariff margin in importing 
product p from country i. Dip is a vector of dummy variables indicating a type of RoOs 
against product p in importing from country i. As a result, Carrere and de Melo (2006) 
demonstrated that the RoOs compliance costs can be computed as Dip β/α.  
We estimate this model for Thai imports from China and Korea in 2011 by 
employing the fractional logit estimation technique proposed by Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996), because our dependent variable lies in the unit interval, i.e. [0, 1].3 The sample 
products are restricted to those with positive tariff margins. The reason for the use of 
import-side data on FTA utilization is that export-side data on FTA utilization is usually 
available at HS six-digit level. In the case of analysis at HS six-digit level, we are forced 
to aggregate arbitrary tariff margins from tariff-line level to HS six-digit level. Then, 
                                                   
2 There are several papers analyzing the determinants on the FTA utilization. Bureau et al. (2007) 
examine utilization of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) granted by the European Union 
(EU) and the United States (US) to developing countries in the agri-goods sector, while Cadot et al. 
(2006) focus on the trade of the EU and the US with their preferential trading partners. Francois et al. 
(2006) and Manchin (2006) examine the preferential trade relations of the EU and 
non-least-developed African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Cotonou Agreement, 
while Hakobyan (2010) examines US GSP utilization by 143 GSP-eligible countries. Keck and 
Lendle (2012) analyze utilization of both unilateral and bilateral preferences by not only the EU and 
US but also Australia and Canada. These studies consistently found that FTA utilization is higher in 
the products with larger tariff margins and less restrictive RoOs. 
3 The fractional logit model ensures that, unlike the ordinary least square method (OLS), the 
predicted values of the dependent variable are in the unit interval. Also, unlike the log-odds ratio 
model and the beta regression model, it can naturally define dependent variables for the boundary 
values 0 and 1. It imposes less restrictive assumptions than the Tobit model (requiring the normality 
and homoskedasticity of the dependent variables). For more details, see Ramalho et al. (2011). 
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although we have the FTA utilization data for all FTAs by Thailand in hand, we restrict 
analysis to FTA partners in which only a single FTA scheme is available, i.e. China and 
Korea.4 Namely, our sample FTA schemes are ACFTA and AKFTA, which are FTAs 
based on the Enabling Clause and GATT Article XXIV, respectively. 
Our data sources are as follows. Data on FTA utilization in Thailand is obtained 
from the Bureau of Trade Preference Development, Department of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Commerce, Kingdom of Thailand. We obtain data on total imports in 
Thailand from the World Trade Atlas. We extract the information on RoOs from the 
legal texts of each FTA. The data on MFN rates are from the WITS TRAINS database. 
We obtain the data on the scheduled FTA rates in Thailand from Thailand Customs. 
     Before reporting our estimation results on this model, we take a brief look at 
FTAs in our sample countries. Specifically, here we focus on ACFTA and AKFTA in 
addition to AJCEP. Figure 1 shows the simple average tariff margin in Thailand for 
these three ASEAN+1 FTAs. We aggregate the tariff-line level difference between 
scheduled FTA rates in each year and MFN rates in 2011. As of 2011, Thailand already 
liberalizes products with large margins in the cases of ACFTA and AKFTA. The average 
margin is near 9%. On the other hand, in the case of AJCEP, the tariff margin rises from 
a small magnitude in 2011 (around 6%) to almost the same magnitude as the cases of 
ACFTA and AKFTA. In sum, compared with ACFTA and AKFTA, AJCEP reduces tariff 
rates at a slow pace. 
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
     Table 1 lists RoOs in Thailand for the three ASEAN+1 FTAs in 2011 at a 
tariff-line level. CS, CH, and CC are the RoOs criteria of “Change in Subheading,” 
“Change in Heading,” and “Change in Chapter,” respectively. WO indicates the 
“Wholly obtained” criterion. In the case of ACFTA, most of the preferential products 
follow its general rule, RVC. The same is true for AKFTA, CH/RVC. On the other hand, 
AJCEP sets many product-specific rules. A relatively large number can be found not 
only in its general rule, CH/RVC, but also in CC. Roughly speaking, restrictiveness is 
expected to increase in the order of CS, CH, and CC because, for example, CC always 
                                                   
4 For example, Thailand has both bilateral and multilateral FTA schemes with Australia, India, Japan, 
and New Zealand. In this case, firms’ decisions on FTA use will be qualitatively different. 
Specifically, firms will choose their tariff scheme among MFN rates, bilateral FTA rates, and 
multilateral FTA rates rather than simply between MFN rates and FTA rates. Since our aim for 
estimation is simply to estimate the RoOs compliance costs, we do not include such complicated 
cases in our analysis. 
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meets CH and CS. Furthermore, when these are combined by AND, restrictiveness 
increases, and declines when combined with OR. Thus, we may say that less restrictive 
RoOs are set in AKFTA. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     Table 2 shows FTA utilization rates in Thai imports from China, Japan, and Korea 
under ASEAN+1 FTA schemes. “Total”, “Ineligible”, and “Under FTA” indicate total 
imports, imports of eligible products under all tariff schemes, and imports of eligible 
products under FTA scheme, respectively. Columns (IV) and (V) report “Total” divided 
by “Ineligible” and “Under FTA”, respectively. The rates in column (V) are usually 
called “FTA utilization rates”. As mentioned above, Thailand has both bilateral and 
multilateral FTAs with Japan, so that FTA utilization rates are rather low in the case of 
AJCEP (1%). Indeed, most of the preferential imports from Japan are known to be 
under Japan-Thailand bilateral FTA. ACFTA and AKFTA have relatively high 
utilization rates, which are 61% and 35% respectively. However, imports under ACFTA 
and AKFTA schemes occupy only 32% and 18% of total imports from China and Korea, 
respectively. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
The estimation results of our fractional logit model are presented in Table 3. For 
estimation, in order to increase the number of observations with each type of RoOs, we 
replace “RVC/WO” and “RVC/TECH” with “RVC” and “CH/RVC/TECH” with 
“CH/RVC”. The coefficient for Margin is estimated to be significantly positive, 
indicating that, consistent with expectations, products with larger tariff margins are 
likely to be imported under FTA schemes. Except for “CH&RVC”, all RoOs dummy 
variables have negative coefficients. However, the estimated order of restrictiveness is 
not necessarily consistent with our expectation. As mentioned above, it is consistent 
with our expectation that “CH” has absolutely (and abnormally) larger coefficients than 
“CH/RVC”. However, we have the opposite orders of restrictiveness between “CC” and 
“CH”, among “CC/RVC”, “CH/RVC”, and “CS/RVC”, and among “CC”, “CC/RVC”, 
and “CC&RVC”. The opposite order can be also found between “CH” and “CH&RVC”. 
The insignificantly positive coefficient for “CH&RVC” and too small coefficient for 
“RVC” are not consistent with our expectations. 
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===   Table 3   === 
 
 
4. Liberalization Level 
     This section computes the liberalization level in Thailand for ACFTA and AKFTA. 
For reference, we also compute that for AJCEP. The results for 2011 are reported in 
Table 4. The first two measures LIB1 and LIB2 can be computed without using the 
above estimation results. LIB1 indicates that Thailand liberalizes 91% of all products in 
all three FTAs. The second measure, which takes the magnitude of general tariff 
reduction into account, shows the interesting difference among the three FTAs. The 
highest level is found in ACFTA (0.903), followed by AKFTA (0.880) and AJCEP 
(0.746). This order can be easily understood by the differences in the magnitude of tariff 
margin confirmed in Figure 1. Compared with the case of AJCEP, Thailand liberalizes 
products with large margins in the cases of ACFTA and AKFTA. This fact leads to the 
differences in LIB2 across three FTAs. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
     Next, we compute the third and fourth measures of liberalization level, which 
require our estimation results on the RoOs compliance costs. As mentioned in the 
previous section, our estimation results on the order of RoOs’ restrictiveness are not 
necessarily consistent with general expectations. Nevertheless, in order to show the 
performance of our liberalization measures, it will be useful to compute liberalization 
levels even using such estimation results. Next, we set the coefficient for “CH&RVC” to 
zero in order to avoid the negative RoOs compliance costs. Moreover, for computation 
in the case of AJCEP, we replace some RoOs in AJCEP which are not included in the 
estimation sample. Specifically, we replace “CC&TECH” and “CC/TECH” with “CC” 
and “CH&TECH”, “CH/TECH”, and “CS” with “CH”.  
The results for the third and fourth measures of liberalization level are also 
reported in Table 4. In each FTA, those two measures show the almost same level. The 
indifference between these two measures is caused at least partly by our use of logistic 
function. For example, the difference between those measures is affected by the 
curvature of function. In this paper, as a first step, we keep the use of standard logistic 
function in computing the fourth measure. These measures indicate that the 
liberalization level in ACFTA is higher than that in AKFTA and AJCEP. This is because 
most of the products liberalized in ACFTA have much lower RoOs compliance costs. 
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RoOs in such products in ACFTA are “RVC”, of which the absolute magnitude of a 
coefficient is estimated to be rather small. On the other hand, since the major RoOs in 
AKFTA and AJCEP are “CH/RVC”, of which the absolute magnitude of a coefficient is 
estimated to be (unexpectedly) larger, the two liberalization measures are low in the 
cases of AKFTA and AJCEP.  
     We also compute these measures over time. Figure 2 depicts the changes in LIB1. 
It rises significantly in 2016 in the case of AKFTA, and in 2017 in the case of AJCEP. 
As a result, in 2018, near 99% of all products have preferential rates (or zero MFN 
rates) in the cases of AKFTA and AJCEP. The time-series changes in LIB2 are shown in 
Figure 3. As shown in Table 4, AJCEP had the lowest LIB2 in 2011. However, it has 
risen significantly since 2011. The liberalization level in AJCEP becomes higher than 
that in ACFTA in 2017 and that in AKFTA in 2018. This is consistent with the finding in 
Figure 1 showing that  AJCEP reduces tariff rates at a slow pace compared with 
ACFTA and AKFTA. In contrast to the remarkable changes over time in these two 
figures, Figures 4 and 5 show the stable transition of LIB3 and LIB4, respectively. Over 
time, both LIB3 and LIB4 do not change significantly. This stability would imply that 
the products liberalized in the latter period have higher RoOs compliance costs. For 
example, in AKFTA and AJCEP, most of such products have “CH/RVC”, for which the 
RoOs compliance costs are estimated to relatively high in this paper. 
 
===   Figures 2-5   === 
 
 
5. Robustness 
     In this section, we conduct some robustness checks on the estimation results. First, 
we include dummy variables on the Section in tariff classification in order to provide a 
control for the role of industrial characteristics in complying with RoOs. The results are 
reported in column (I) in Table 5 and are quantitatively unchanged with those in Table 3. 
Namely, the estimated order of restrictiveness among some types of RoOs is again not 
necessarily consistent with our expectation. However, the coefficient for “CH&RVC” 
turns out to be negative, though insignificant.  
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
Second, as in recent studies on FTA utilization, we provide a control for the 
magnitude of trade. As theoretically demonstrated in Demidova and Krishna (2008), 
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even if the tariff margin is trivial, the more productive firms are more likely to use FTA 
schemes in exporting because such firms have larger outputs and thus obtain larger 
gains from the use of FTA schemes. Following Hakobyan (2013), we introduce total 
imports of a concerned product from China or Korea. Furthermore, in order to avoid the 
simultaneity problem between this variable and a dependent variable (especially its 
denominator), one year lagged imports are used (Lagged Imports).5 The results are 
reported in column (II) in Table 5. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient for 
Lagged Imports is estimated to be significantly positive. Although the absolute 
magnitude of the coefficient for “CC&RVC” turns out to be a little larger than that for 
“CC”, there are still many combinations in which the order of restrictiveness is not 
consistent with general expectations. 
Third, as pointed out in the Hakobyan (2013), the coefficient for the magnitude of 
trade, i.e. Lagged Imports, might suffer from endogeneity biases because unobserved 
shocks have an influence on both trade values and the dependent variable (particularly 
its denominator). Thus, we use the instrumental variable (IV) method. Following 
Hakobyan (2013), we use total imports of a concerned product i from the rest of the 
world (ROW) as an instrument variable, for which data is also obtained from the World 
Trade Atlas. The results are reported in column (III) in Table 5. Although the coefficient 
for the tariff margin is again significantly positive, the results for RoOs are not good at 
all. In particular, some types have positively significant coefficients. Moreover, “Lagged 
Imports” has an insignificant coefficient and wrong sign. 
Last, our estimates may suffer from sample selection biases because we restrict 
our sample only to observations with positive imports, due to the nature of the 
denominator of our dependent variable. Using the total imports of a concerned product i 
from the rest of the world (i.e. ROW) as an excluded variable, we estimate the Heckman 
sample selection model.6 The results are reported in column (II) in Table 5 and are 
similar to those in column (III), i.e. those by IV technique. The coefficients for tariff 
margin and lagged imports are significantly positive. Although all RoOs dummy 
variables except for “CH&RVC” have negative coefficients, the results in RoOs are not 
good at all.  
     Based on these estimates, we again compute measures of liberalization levels. 
                                                   
5 The data on Lagged Imports are obtained from World Trade Atlas. 
6 Our aim here is different from Manchin (2006), which employs the Heckman estimation technique 
in order to include zero utilization rates into estimation sample. Namely, while ours is to tackle zero 
issues for the denominator of utilization rates, Manchin (2006) uses the Heckman to tackle zero 
issues for the numerator of utilization rates. Also, we naturally include zero utilization rates because 
we do not take a log of utilization rates as in the previous studies except for Manchin (2006). 
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Since the first and second measures do not need such estimates for computation, we 
only report the third and fourth measures in 2011, which are provided in Table 6. 
Although the level of these measures differs by estimation technique, the order is 
consistent with that in Table 4. Namely, the liberalization level in ACFTA is higher than 
that in AKFTA and AJCEP. Furthermore, except for the case of controlling sector 
dummy variables, the level in AKFTA is a bit higher than that in AJCEP. The higher 
levels in the cases of Heckman and IV are due to the fact that, as reported above, most 
of the coefficients for RoOs dummy variables are transformed to zero in order to avoid 
negative RoOs compliance costs or have trivial magnitude. Thus the tariff reduction 
rates in most of the preferential products are counted without being significantly 
penalized. 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have proposed new measures of the FTA liberalization level. Our 
measures take three issues into account. First, in order to identify the differences in FTA 
liberalization level over time, we compute the annual liberalization level rather than the 
level during the whole period. Second, our measure includes information on the tariff 
margin, i.e. the difference between FTA rates and MFN rates. Third, the restrictiveness 
of RoOs is also taken into account in order to penalize the liberalization level of 
products with more restrictive RoOs. The RoOs restrictiveness is quantified by 
estimating the equation on determinants of FTA utilization rates. In this paper, we 
computed such measures of FTA liberalization level for three FTAs, including ACFTA, 
AKFTA, and AJCEP, in Thailand. One remaining important challenge is to obtain more 
precise estimates of the RoOs compliance costs, which play a crucial role in computing 
our measures. To do that, for example, it will be helpful to use FTA utilization data from 
as many countries as possible. 
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Table 1. RoOs in Thailand for ASEAN+1 FTAs 
ACFTA AJCEP AKFTA
CC 1 1,170 4
CC&RVC 13
CC&TECH 487       
CC/RVC 21 136 665
CC/TECH 53       
CH 243 15
CH&RVC 5
CH&TECH 86       
CH/RVC 127 3,381 4,699
CH/RVC/TECH 21
CH/TECH 185       
CS 17       
CS/RVC 55 93
RVC 5,323 415 256
RVC/TECH 461       
RVC/WO 12
WO 22 5 615
Total 5,955 6,233 6,398  
Source: Authors’ classification based on legal texts on each FTA 
16 
 
Table 2. FTA Utilization in Thailand in 2011 
Total In Eligible Under FTA
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
= (III)/(I) = (III)/(II)
ACFTA 617,733 321,348 194,817 32% 61%
AJCEP 725,302 286,301 1,769 0.2% 1%
AKFTA 171,939 89,227 31,634 18% 35%  
Sources: World Trade Atlas; Bureau of Trade Preference Development, Department of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Commerce, Kingdom of Thailand. 
Note: “Total”, “In Eligible”, and “Under FTA” indicate total imports, total imports in only products 
eligible to each FTA, and imports under FTA schemes, respectively. 
  
17 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results: Fractional-logit Model 
Coef. Robust S.E. P>z
Margin 0.019 0.003 0.000
CC -1.167 1.334 0.382
CC&RVC -0.524 1.003 0.602
CC/RVC -1.819 0.146 0.000
CH -13.397 0.799 0.000
CH&RVC 0.678 0.986 0.492
CH/RVC -1.863 0.055 0.000
CS/RVC -2.779 0.437 0.000
RVC -0.309 0.040 0.000
WO -3.005 0.413 0.000
Log pseudolikelihood -3,797
Number of Obs. 7,398  
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Table 4. FTA Liberalization in Thailand for 2011 
ACFTA AKFTA AJCEP
LIB1 0.916 0.914 0.908
LIB2 0.903 0.880 0.746
LIB3 0.401 0.208 0.200
LIB4 0.401 0.209 0.200  
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Table 5. Robustness Checks 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Fractional Fractional IV Heckman
Margin 0.006** 0.027*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
CC -1.365 -1.945* 0.247 -0.060
[1.207] [1.143] [0.294] [0.202]
CC&RVC -0.760 -1.947** 0.409 -0.072
[1.084] [0.822] [0.255] [0.204]
CC/RVC -2.204*** -2.984*** 0.129*** -0.249***
[0.244] [0.160] [0.033] [0.042]
CH -14.147*** -16.136*** -0.108 -0.531***
[0.745] [0.929] [0.083] [0.103]
CH&RVC -0.138 -1.151 0.686*** 0.142
[1.009] [0.926] [0.209] [0.245]
CH/RVC -1.960*** -3.292*** 0.136*** -0.274***
[0.204] [0.107] [0.026] [0.031]
CS/RVC -2.436*** -4.344*** 0.053 -0.358***
[0.479] [0.440] [0.040] [0.030]
RVC -0.385* -1.953*** 0.451*** -0.089
[0.197] [0.111] [0.033] [0.072]
WO -3.741*** -3.960*** 0.004 -0.279***
[0.505] [0.425] [0.032] [0.038]
Lagged Imports 0.131*** -0.001 0.029***
[0.007] [0.002] [0.002]
ROW 0.700*** 0.029***
[0.020] [0.002]
Section Dummy YES NO NO NO
Log pseudolikelihood -3,615 -3,624 -8914
Chi2 for Wald test (Rho = 0) 7.48
Number of Obs. 7,398 7,398 7,929 11,694  
Notes: The parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. We report coefficients for only an excluded variable and an instrument, i.e. 
imports from rest of the world (ROW), in the cases of selection equation in Heckman and the 
first-stage regression equation in IV, respectively. 
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Table 6. FTA Liberalization in Thailand for 2011: Robustness Checks 
ACFTA AJCEP AKFTA
(I) Controlling Sector Dummy
LIB3 0.516 0.230 0.207
LIB4 0.512 0.229 0.207
(II) Controlling Lagged Imports
LIB3 0.198 0.197 0.197
LIB4 0.198 0.197 0.197
(III) IV Method
LIB3 0.903 0.689 0.880
LIB4 0.867 0.658 0.844
(IV) Heckman Method
LIB3 0.903 0.740 0.880
LIB4 0.902 0.708 0.846  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the results reported in Table 5. 
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Figure 1. Average Tariff Margin in Thailand for ASEAN+1 FTAs 
 
Sources: WITS TRAINS; Thailand Customs 
 
Figure 2. Time-series Changes in LIB1 
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Figure 3. Time-series Changes in LIB2 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Time-series Changes in LIB3 
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Figure 5. Time-series Changes in LIB4  
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